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for Radical Buddhism inModern Japan
James Mark Shields
Bucknell University, Lewisburg, usa
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Abstract
The late Meiji period (1868–1912) witnessed the birth of various forms of “progressive”
and “radical” Buddhism both within and beyond traditional Japanese Buddhist insti-
tutions. This paper examines several historical precedents for “Buddhist revolution”
in East Asian—and particularly Japanese—peasant rebellions of the early modern
period. I argue that these rebellions, or at least the received narratives of such, provided
significant “root paradigms” for the thought and practice of early Buddhist socialists
and radical Buddhists of early twentieth century Japan. Even if these narratives ended
in “failure”—as, indeed, they often did—they can be understood as examples of what
James White calls “expressionistic action,” in which figures act out of interests or on
the basis of principle without concern for “success.” AlthoughWhite argues that: “Such
expressionistic action was not a significant component of popular contention in Toku-
gawa Japan”—that does not mean that the received tales were not interpreted in such
a fashion by later Meiji, Taishō and Shōwa-era sympathizers.
Keywords
Buddhist modernism – radical Buddhism – peasant rebellion – religion and politics
September 1905. A stunning victory over amajor European power in the Russo-
Japanese War provided substantial wind to the sails of emerging Japanese
imperialism and justified, to some degree, the political and cultural changes
that had roiled the nation since theMeiji Restoration of 1868. At the same time,
however, societal and economic fractures brought on by industrial capitalism,
combined with an influx of liberal and radical thought from Russia and West-
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ern Europe gave birth to a nascent—and highly eclectic—socialist movement,
which found support among those who were opposed to the war.1 Japanese
Buddhist institutions, for the most part, either supported the prevailing ide-
ological winds or stayed cautiously out of the fray, but there were those—
both individual priests and young lay scholars and activists—who sought to
build bridges between progressive thought and praxis and Buddhist ideals.
The New Buddhist Fellowship, born in 1899 and led by young lay-Buddhists
SakainoKōyō境野黄洋 (1871–1933),WatanabeKaikyoku渡辺海旭 (1872–1933),
Sugimura Sojinkan杉村楚人冠 (1872–1945), Takashima Beihō高嶋米峰 (1875–
1949)—and including a young Suzuki Daisetsu鈴木大拙 (1870–1966)—is per-
haps the best example of a progressive (though not radical) form of Japanese
Buddhist modernism that flourished in the waning years of Meiji. The same
period saw the emergence of what I refer to as “radical Buddhism,” exempli-
fied in the life andwork of Takagi Kenmyō高木顕明 (1864–1914) andUchiyama
Gudō内山愚童 (1874–1911), two renegade Buddhist priests who sought a radi-
cal transformation of individual and social being through a fusion of Buddhist
ideals and left-wing political theories such as socialism, communism and anar-
chism. These early experiments in radical Buddhismwere brought to an abrupt
end with the government crackdown known as the High Treason Incident
(Taigyaku jiken大逆事件) of 1910–1911, which also serves as a coda to Meiji-era
Buddhist progressivism.
I have dealt with most of the above figures and movements, examining
in some detail their historical context and their religious and philosophical
sources, elsewhere (e.g., Shields 2012, 2014; Shields and Ladwig 2014). In this
paper, I examine the question of precedents to “radical Buddhism” in East
Asian—and particularly Japanese—peasant rebellions of the early modern
period. I suggest that these rebellions, or at least the receivednarratives of such,
provided significant “root paradigms” for the thought andpractice of early Bud-
dhist socialists and radical Buddhists such as Takagi Kenmyō and Uchiyama
Gudō (seeWhite 1995: 107; Bercé 1980: 334; Najita and Koschmann 1982: 129). In
many rural areas of earlymodern Japan, such “cultures of contention”—passed
down via legends, songs, and chronicles—provided a deeply rooted set ofmod-
els and a vocabulary for resistance and rebellion, if not outright revolution.
Some of these tales transcended regional relevance to become multiregional
or even nationally known legends (Yokoyama 1975: 225). Even if these narra-
tives ended in “failure”—as, indeed, they often did—they can be understood
1 It should also be noted that evenmany Japanese who had supported thewar were enraged by
the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, which lacked provision for territorial gains andmonetary
reparations. Rioting ensued.
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as examples of what JamesWhite calls “expressionistic action,” inwhich figures
act out of interests or on the basis of principle without concern for “success”
(see Scott-Stokes 1974; Morris 1975). AlthoughWhite argues that: “Such expres-
sionistic actionwasnot a significant component of popular contention inToku-
gawa Japan”—that does not mean that the received tales were not interpreted
in such a fashion by later Meiji, Taishō and Shōwa-era sympathizers (White
1995: 16 n. 20).
Peasant Revolts and Religion in East Asia
Peasant revolts are a standard feature in the histories of virtually all civiliza-
tions, and those of East Asia are no exception to the rule. As in Christian
Europe, such revolts usually beganwith grievances related to taxation, drought
or some other agrarian crisis, but would quickly take on a religious—and fre-
quently messianic—coloring.2 One precedent for popular revolt in China was,
of course, the Mandate of Heaven (Ch. tiānmìng天命), which, as interpreted
through Mencius and adopted by Neo-Confucians such as Wang Yangming
王陽明 (Ō Yōmei, 1472–1529), left open the possibility that the rule of the
sovereign was contingent on a certain measure of stability and security within
the realm. If such security and stabilitywasperceived tobe lacking, or themoral
character of the Emperor judged to be wanting, then regime change could
be justified as “divinely ordained revolution” (ekisei kakumei易姓革命). While
major uprisings in China are more often associated with Daoism (e.g., the Yel-
low Turban Rebellion and Five Pecks of Rice Rebellion of the late second-early
third centuries ce), a long tradition of looking for the return of the bodhi-
sattva and future Buddha Maitreya (Miroku 弥勒) was occasionally invoked
as a justification or explanation for political unrest on the part of the lower
strata of society—the peasants in particular. Perhaps the best example of this
in China was the White Lotus Rebellion of 1796–1804, in which an appeal to
the return of Maitreya—and a promise of universal salvation—was combined
with anti-Manchu sentiments in an (unsuccessful) attempt to overthrow the
Qing regime.3
2 The locus classicus for medieval Europe is the well-known Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, led by
Wat Tyler, John Ball and Jack Straw, often credited with bringing about an end to serfdom
in England. These figures would serve as inspirations to nineteenth-century British socialists
such as WilliamMorris (1834–1896).
3 The White Lotus Rebellion set the precedent for the much larger Taiping Rebellion of 1851–
1864, which is arguably the bloodiest peasant uprising in East Asian (if not world) history.
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In Japan, the most significant peasant rebellions associated with Buddhism
were the ikkō-ikki一向一揆 revolts of the Muromachi period (1336–1573).4 In
this case, peasant farmers, monks and some nobles banded together to fight
against samurai rule under the inspiration of Amida Buddha and the Jōdo
Shinshū浄土真宗 teachings.5 Contemporary Shin sect reformer Rennyo蓮如
(1415–1499), who preached a form of Pure Land Buddhism that was populist
in nature, was a clear inspiration to the rebels—though he was careful to dis-
tinguish himself from the uprising and subsequent violence (Weinstein 2006:
55). In particular, Rennyo attempted to clarify that while single-mindedness
(i.e., ikkō) was to be encouraged in the context of devotion to Amida’s vow of
salvation, it should not extend into militant or antinomian activities. Despite
Rennyo’s admonitions, in 1488 the ikki successfully overthrew the rulers of
Kaga加賀 province, and established bases in other regions over the next few
decades.Unsurprisingly, this caught the attentionof the secular authorities, but
while the ikki of Mikawa province were defeated at the Battle of Akukizaka in
1564, other branches continued to exist throughout the Edoperiod (1603–1868),
partly due to alliances with powerful daimyō, including Ashikaga Yoshiaki足
利義昭 (1537–1597) and, for a time, Toyotomi Hideyoshi豊臣秀吉 (1537–1598).
Eventually, Oda Nobunaga織田信長 (1534–1582) and his forces would destroy
the fortresses of the Ikkō sect at Nagashima長島 and Ishiyama Honganji石山
本願寺 (now Osaka Castle), and the sect, or what was left of it, would be out-
lawed under the Tokugawa bakufu.6
Here, too, religious ideologywas central, though in this case itwas the idiosyncratic Christian-
ity of revolt leader Hong Xiuquan洪秀全 (1814–1864). And of course, Japan had experienced
its own version of a “Christian” uprising two centuries previous, with the Shimabara Rebellion
(Shimabara no ran島原の乱) led by Amakusa Shirō天草四郎 (1621–1638).While smaller in
scale than the Taiping Rebellon, the Shimabara Rebellion “left lasting memories of peasant
resistance to tyrannical lordship” (Bix 1986: 7).
4 For reasons that may be obvious, peasant uprisings in Japan have attracted a significant
amount of scholarly attention, including the following full-length works in English: Kelly
(1985); Bix (1986); Vlastos (1986); Walthall (1986, 1991); White (1995); Esenbel (1998). See also
Najita and Koschmann (1982), which deals with the general issue of conflict inmodern Japan.
Perhaps the best source in Japanese is Yokoyama (1975).
5 The Ikkō sect was originally founded by Ikkō Shunjo一向俊聖 (1239–1287), a teacher of the
Chinzei branchof the Jōdo浄土orPureLand sect.However, underpressure fromcrackdowns
by authorities against all forms of Amidist pietism, most of his followers would eventually
defect for the “mainstream” Jōdo Shin or True Pure Land sect, and adhere to the teachings of
Rennyo; see Pauly (1985: 361).
6 See Amstutz (2010: 66–67) formore on ikkō-ikki in relation to Shin Buddhism and the buraku-
min; also see Tsang (2007).
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Though it is usually, and with some justification, lauded as an era of peace
and security after centuries of near constant warfare, the succeeding Edo
period witnessed the emergence of several individuals whose “progressive”
ideas and activities in support of the rural poorwould have a significant impact
on the lives and work of progressives and radicals throughout theMeiji period.
The first of these, who would serve as a direct inspiration to Uchiyama Gudō, is
Sakura Sōgorō佐倉惣五郎 (1605–1653), a semi-legendary farmer whose direct
appeal to the shōgun to ease the tax burden on peasants and assist with their
lack of agricultural productivity led to his arrest and crucifixion—but also to
a remission of the taxes and excess duties. While the story of “self-sacrificing
man” Sōgorō passed into legend via gimin densetsu義民伝説 (legends of exem-
plary martyrs) and the kabuki stage—itself an important outlet for popular
resentment in the early to mid-Edo period—it is nearly impossible to verify
anyhistorical facts in his tale.What is certain is that, in themid-eighteenth cen-
tury, a hundred years after Sōgorō’s death, a temple was erected in his memory,
where the peasant martyr was worshipped as a daimyōjin相明神—i.e., a high-
ranking Shintō deity.7 The temple soon became a pilgrimage site, and the story
of Sōgorō was carried throughout the country, reaching even remote parts of
Kyushu. By the nineteenth-century, he had become, in Anne Walthall’s words,
“the patron saint of protest.”8
Unlike Sōgo-sama, two other figures that bear mention in this regard both
lived and died within the living memory of those of the early Meiji period, and
thus can be taken as historical rather than simply literary models. The first of
these, Ōshio Heihachirō 大塩平八郎 (1793–1837), was a low-ranking samurai
police inspector as well as a Neo-Confucian scholar in Osaka. Increasingly fed
up with corruption within the city administration, in 1830 Ōshio resigned his
post, and established his own training center called the Seishindō洗心洞 (lit.,
Heart-mind Cleansing Den). His teachings and lecture notes would eventually
be compiled in a text knownas Seishindō sakki洗心洞箚記. In 1836, as Japanese
farmers struggled through themost severe famine in decades, Ōshio, like Sōgō-
7 It bears noting that, as with the Heian-period cult of Tenjin-sama 天神様 (Sugawara no
Michizane菅原道真, 845–903), the enshrinement of Sōgorō as Daimyōjin Sōgo-sama was
at least as much a way to pacify his restless and vengeful spirit (goryō御霊) as it was a form
of gratitude for his deeds.
8 Walthall 1991c: 36–37. Sōgorō’s fame was so widespread by the end of the nineteenth century
that at least two versions of his story were translated into English: George Braithwaite’s
Life of Sogoro: The Farmer Patriot of Sakura (1897)—prefaced with several biblical passages
enjoining sacrifice as well as an appeal to the Japanese to embrace “the love of the Lord Jesus
Christ”—and Viscount Hayashi Tadasu’s For His People (1903).
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sama before him, made a direct appeal to regional magistrates to help the
people. Refused (though not, in this case, crucified), he reportedly sold all
his possessions—including his substantial library—to purchase food for the
suffering poor.
At this point, Ōshio’s tale seems a near-perfect recapitulation of the Sōgo-
sama legend. However, things take on a more radical—or perhaps modern—
turn in the following year, 1837, when the former police inspector published
a manifesto charging the chief city magistrate (bugyō奉行) with corruption.
After invoking the name of both the Emperor, who “has been kept in seclusion
and has lost the power to dispense rewards and punishments,” and the founder
of the Tokugawa shogunate, who “decreed that to show compassion for the
widows, widowers and the lonely is the foundation of benevolent government
( jinsei仁政),” the manifesto states its aims in a remarkably forthright manner:
For the sake of all under heaven, knowing that we have no one to depend
on and that wemay bring on punishments to our families, […we] resolve
to do the following: First we shall execute those officials who torment and
harass those who are lowly. Next we shall execute those richmerchants in
the city of Osaka who are accustomed to the life of luxury. Then we shall
uncover gold and silver coins and other valuables they hoard as well as
bags of rice kept hidden in their storagehouses. Theywill be distributed to
thosewhodonot own fields or gardens in the domains of Settsu, Kawachi,
Izumi andHarima, and to thosewhomay own lands, but have a hard time
supporting fathers, mothers, wives and other members of the family […]
Whatwedo is to follow the commandof heaven to render thepunishment
of heaven.
lu 1997: 280–281
Soon afterwards, Ōshio led an “army” of (mainly landholding) peasants, stu-
dents, low-ranking samurai officials and social outcastes—along with two
Shintō priests—on a rampage of destruction throughout Osaka. The rebels,
carrying banners festoonedwith “save the people” and “Amaterasu,” succeeded
in burning down one-fifth of the city before being quashed by government
troops. Amidst the resulting confusion and conflagration, Ōshio went miss-
ing for forty days, at which point he was tracked down by the authorities and
committed suicide upon being discovered. Despite the failure of his upris-
ing, “Ōshio-sama” immediately became a folk hero among peasants and even
some merchants and samurai—a Japanese version of American abolitionist
folk hero John Brown (1800–1859). After his death, handwritten copies of his
manifesto spread throughout the country, touching a chord with peasants in
peasant revolts as anti-authoritarian archetypes 9
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many regions. His story was retold (and embellished) in Mori Ōgai’s 森鷗外
(1862–1922) novella Ōshio Heihachirō, published in January 1914, not long after
the High Treason Incident, and over the succeeding decades served as inspira-
tion to a diverse group of movements and people, including the Freedom and
Popular Rights Movement of the 1870s and 1880s, General Nogi Maresuke乃木
希典 (1849–1912),MishimaYukio三島由紀夫 (1925–1970) and left-wing student
radicals of the 1960s. According to Marius Jansen: “His ill-fated revolt served
as the climax to the Tokugawa tradition of protest, and it foreshadowed later
expressions of nihilistic violence” (Jansen 2000: 223).
Like Ōshio, Ninomiya Sontoku二宮尊徳 (1787–1856) was born in the late-
eighteenth century, and thus spentmost of his adult life in the tumultuous final
decades of the bakufu period. Born into a poor peasant family in Kayama栢山,
Sagami相模 province (now western Kanagawa prefecture), by his late twen-
ties the famously self-educated Ninomiya had became a wealthy landowner
as well as an agricultural innovator. Catching the attention of the authorities
for his administrative techniques, he was eventually recruited to run one of
the shōgun’s estates, a significant honor for a person of such humble begin-
nings. His ideas soon became the accepted standard for land management in
the late Edo period, and Ninomiya was granted the name Sontoku尊徳 (lit.,
priceless virtue) for his talents and accomplishments. Upon his death in 1856,
he was granted posthumous honors, and is revered even today as a model of
educational diligence and selfless virtue. This brief biography reveals a striking
distinction with the other gimin discussed in this section—and also with the
earlier ikkō-ikki movement. While committed to agricultural reforms to alle-
viate the suffering of the rural poor, Sontoku was not, in any sense, a “rebel”
or “radical.” He never engaged in political activism against the state, and as a
result was never subject to persecution. I will return to this difference below, as
I believe it is instructive in helping us to understand the various forces at work
in shaping the gimin narrative that would pass into the social discourse of the
Meiji era.
While it would be anachronistic to call these movements or individuals
“socialist”—at least in the way the term is usually understood today—they
play an important role as precedents for “righteous revolt” on the part of the
common people against the secular authorities. Whether we follow Yokoyama
Toshio in understanding of early modern peasant revolts as the incipient for-
mation of a revolutionary class consciousness, or Ann Walthall’s more mod-
erate reading of such as calls for social reform, one common feature of these
movements is the self-conscious employment and reinterpretation religious
doctrines as “political” (in some cases, military) slogans, in a way that prefig-
ures the work of progressive and radical Buddhists of the modern period (see
10 shields
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Yokoyama 1977;Walthall 1991c). The ikki carried banners with the words “Namu
Amida butsu”南無阿弥陀仏 and “Renounce this Defiled World and Attain the
Pure Land.”While these are traditional phrases within both Jōdo and Shin Bud-
dhism, the political implications go well beyond traditional interpretations.
For one, an appeal is made to Amida, and Amida’s vow of universal salva-
tion, as a “law” that extends beyond those of the realm, including “secular”
customs of harmony, hierarchy, loyalty and obedience. Second, the invocation
to “renounce this defiled world and attain the Pure Land” seems to indicate a
belief in the possibility of establishing a “Pure Land” here on earth—similar
to the understanding of the “Buddha land” (bukkokudo 仏国土) within the
Nichiren日蓮 sect and related to themore general expression yonaoshi世直し,
which gained currency in the later Edo period (see below).
The term ikki itself invites further comment in this regard. Though the word
originally implied “identity”—i.e., two apparently distinct things being, in the
familiar Buddhist expression “not other than [one another]”—by the time of
the Kenmu Restoration in the fourteenth century it had become linked to the
expression ichimi dōshin一味同心 (i.e., solidarity band, but literally: “people
working together with one mind”). Ichimi dōshin were special social groups
established in order to formulate an “objective” decision on issues involving
matters of justice.9 The underlying belief was that in making such a bond one
was released from both personal but also familial biases; in other words, by
entering the ichimi dōshin one aligned oneself with the (impersonal and objec-
tive) “will of heaven” (Bix 1986: 143). Though the terminology here is Chinese,
there are echoes of indigenous beliefs concerning the ability of humans to
channel and carry out the will of the heavenly kami神 or buddhas.10 Further-
more,Walthall notes that during theMuromachi period, “self-governing bodies
ofmonks drewon theKamakuramodel [of ichimi dōshin], plus a primitive Bud-
9 Though rarely involved in political unrest, the kō講 confraternities that proliferated in
the early nineteenth century may be considered descendants of the ichimi dōshin in the
sense that they were social groups based on common interests, and were often, though
not always, focused on achieving worldly benefits. Some, like Fujikō冨士講, evolved into
new religious movements. For more on kō, see Ito (1952); for buraku confraternities, see
Andachi (1997: 591–593); Yamamoto (1999: 383–413); Nobi (2007).
10 Katsumata (1982: 23–24); also see Walthall (1991a: 12): “Peasants also used the shrine
precincts and other sacred places on the margins of human habitation for village assem-
blies. Meeting in the presence of the gods was believed essential if human beings were
to reconcile their differences and reach a consensus because it seemed to take a miracle
for unanimity to be reached. It was claimed that this sign of a divine presence made the
decision legitimate.”
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dhist system of autonomous, sacred assembly, to unite in a union both political
and religious when debating matters that pertained to the group as a whole”
(Walthall 1986: 16).
In short, as Bix concludes, relying on the work of Katsumata Shizuo勝俣鎮
夫:
The consciousness of man’s oneness with the gods shapes many of the
characteristic features of the ikki: its belief in justice beyond consan-
guineous ties, initiative among participants in the solidarity band, and
their strong independence and freedom from the ruling powers … So the
ikkiwas not only a habit, a defense, and a right to be exercised by peasants
in times of acute crisis. It was also a ritual for keeping alive prefeudal ideas
of impartial justice, equality, and equity in a society dominated by kinship,
hierarchy and fixed status.
bix 1986: 143 (my emphasis)
Of particular note here is the assertion that the ikki peasant revolts involved
a complete refashioning of both kinship ties and hierarchical models of soci-
ety—a shift, we might say, from a strictly vertical and largely static vision
of the world to one that is radically horizontal and fluid. One thinks of the
classical Chinese phrase “heaven-humanity-together-one” (Ch. tianren heyi天
人合一), but the conflation of the two realms is arguably much stronger in
the ikki, reminiscent of Andō Shōeki’s radical homophonic transposition of
the categories ten/chi 天地 (heaven and earth) with tenchi 転定 (movement
and rest) (Najita 2002: 71). In symbolic terms, this radical transposition is most
apparent in the act of signing a petition or oath in circular or umbrella shape, a
practice that dates to some early ikki but becomes especially commonwith the
yonaoshi movements of the 1860s and 1870s (see Esenbel 1998: 26; Katsumata
1982: 131).
While the specific doctrinal connections may be less apparent than with
the ikkō-ikki, the heroic narratives of the individual gimin discussed above also
show Buddhist—or at least Buddhistic—elements. It is certainly possible to
interpret the actions of Sōgō-sama as a bodhisattva (bosatsu菩薩) in the tra-
ditional Mahāyāna understanding of the term. Bodhisattvas are understood as
beings whose infinite compassion for other beings drives them to make sacri-
fices, both with regard to material comforts (like Śākyamuni) and, in popular
texts such as the Jātaka Tales, by giving up their lives for others, if the occasion
demands it. It bears noting, here, that while the term gimin can be translated
as “martyr,” it is normally distinguished from junkyōsha殉教者, the traditional
term for “religious martyr.” While the former can be literally glossed as “(a per-
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son of) public spiritedness,” the latter implies a “person who dies for (a set of)
teachings.” Instead of personal sacrifice for an idea or doctrine(s), the gimin is
one who sacrifices for the “people”—meaning the village community, rather
than the state. Bix defines gimin as “village representatives who pitted them-
selves against the bakuhan state, suffering torture and martyrdom for the sake
of their villages. Because they saved others and preserved the community by
their painful deaths, they acquired in time the quality of deities” (Bix 1986:
xxiii). Finally, as an extension of their anti-authoritarian tone, narratives of
gimin and ikki often display a strong anti-clerical streak—albeit one that rarely
questions basic Buddhist doctrine or cosmology. Rather, as with the later New
Buddhists of mid-Meiji, priests are chastised for failing to live up to their pro-
fessed standards of ethical conduct—and particularly their vow of compassion
for all people.11 There is a layer of irony here, given that prominent twentieth-
century historian Tsuji Zennosuke辻善之助 (1877–1955) argues that Buddhist
participation in and organization of ikki is one of the five aspects that identify
Edo-periodBuddhismas “degenerate” andworthyof thepersecution it received
at the hands of Shintōist elements acting in the name of the fledgling Meiji
state. For Tsuji, this was part and parcel of the larger “problem” of the unrepen-
tantworldliness of Buddhist sects and priests, who, in his evocative phrase, had
“fallen into realism” (genjitsushugi ni dashita現実主義にだした).12
11 In one nineteenth-century version of the Sōgorō legend, the narrator interrupts his story
at its climax to make the following “comment”: “It was fine for the priest from Tōkō-ji to
appear at this juncture and accept the children’s remains, but it would have been even
better had he busied himself before the children were killed, so as not to have had to
take care of them … ‘What is the purpose of priests putting on dyed robes and rolling
the Buddha’s name around in their mouths?’ people muttered to each other … There
are lots of priests in the important temples of the Sakura domain besides this one from
Tōkō-ji, but they value their lives, keep their mouths shut from one year to the next,
and it is asking too much of them to turn to the Buddha even when they are sick. How
these bonzes stink of meat!” (Walthall 1991c: 65). We might read this as a popular version
of the anti-clericalism of Edo-period Confucian scholars such as Kumazawa Banzan熊
沢蕃山 (1619–1691) and nativists like Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), which was to some
extent internalized by Buddhist modernists from the late-1880s and reiterated by radical
Buddhists such as Seno’o Girō in the 1930s.
12 Tsuji (1984: 27–102); see Ketelaar (1990: 11–12). To add another layer of irony, this charge
runs directly counter to the common rebuke of Buddhists from Edo-period Confucians
(and reiterated by some Meiji-era secularists); i.e., that Buddhism was “other-worldly”
(segaiteki 世外的) and Buddhists priests should be (and at times were) compelled to
“return to the secular” (genzoku還俗).
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Bix goes on to note several implications we can derive from the emergence
of the gimin in the Edo period: 1) an implicit rejection on the part of the
peasants of the ruling-class ideology that social relations were natural and
unbreakable rather than artificial andmalleable; 2) a lingering ideal of pacifism
(ideal giminwere not violent, though they fought in self-defense and destroyed
property); 3) gimin legends were most evident when the bakufu state was
strong, suggesting a type of psychological compensation; 4) as noted above,
stories of past gimin, especially when “sacralized” by deification, could act as
spurs for further unrest, creating an ongoing “theology of resistance.”13 By the
time of Ōshio Heihachirō in the 1830s, peasant revolts, whether led by gimin
or otherwise, had begun to take on a more explicitly religious tone, with some
participants referring to themselves as kami of world renewal (yonaoshi) (Bix
1986: 142). Though the term yonaoshi has ancient agricultural roots—having to
do with the removal of any obstacles inhibiting a good rice-growing season—
by the late Edo period it had come to imply a complete transformation of
social (and economic) life, whether brought on by a gimin, kami, ikki, or some
combination of the three.14 Of note, however, is the fact that yonaoshi was
most often understood as world-affirming, seldom if ever implying any sort of
a religious transcendence or rejection/negation of this world.15 In this sense,
13 Bix (1986: xxxiii–xxxiv); “theology of resistance” is my term, not Bix’s. I use it in full
awareness that “theology” invokes a Western/Christian paradigm; and yet, I believe that
the term invokes a “faith” perspective that falls somewhere between “ideology” and simple
reactive impulse to oppression (what Mannheim would call chiliasm). While obviously
not “systematic” in any sense, it involves a strong soteriological component reminiscent
of Christian “liberation theologies.”
14 Marius Jansen is dismissive of the political implications of ikki movements, suggesting
that “there was little thought of devising a different social order.” And as for the yonaoshi
experiments, which seem to imply amore thorough transformation, “their net total was as
often ludicrous and carnival as it was purposeful” (Jansen 2000: 236). I disagree, following
Bix and other scholars who see in the Edo peasant revolts, if not “revolutionary” intent, a
clear precedent for appeals to egalitarian justice and social (as well as economic) change.
As for yonaoshi, I defer to Emma Goldmann’s (1869–1940) classic (possibly apocryphal)
epithet: “If I can’t dance, it’s not my revolution.”
15 Bix (1986: 145). Unsurprisingly, this was also the time of the emergence of new religious
movements such as Tenrikyō天理教, Konkōkyō金光教, Kurozumikyō黒住教, Maruya-
makyō丸山教 and Fujikō, all of which preached some form of “world renewal”—though
Bix argues that ultimately thesenew religions inhibited radical social changebyprivileging
“self-renewal and reconciliation” (Bix 1986: 154). In other words, by directing the energies
of class conflict internally, they actedmuch like theBuddhist andChristian socialistmove-
ments inspired by Tolstoy in the early twentieth century (see Shields forthcoming).
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the religious language subsumes a message that is overtly political (and quasi-
socialistic), however “utopian.”16
In our discussion of religious influence on peasant instigators, we can dig
much deeper with Ōshio than we were able to do with Sōgo-sama, by virtue
of the fact that we have a record of his teachings, including a detailed account
of his adherence to the Neo-Confucian philosophy of Wang Yangming, whose
ideas had an impact—often indirect—in shaping the intellectual climate of
late Edo Japan. While not necessarily radical, Wang Yangming’s idealism was
rooted in several assumptions about human knowledge and action that allow
for a connection with the activism of gimin like Ōshio. First and foremost
is Wang’s insistence on the mutuality of knowledge and practice or action
(Ch. zhīxíng héyi; Jp. chikō gōitsu 知行合一) which privileges practical activ-
ity, and especially ethical action, above abstract wisdom. Second, Wang argues
that while “innate” knowledge can only emerge from a cleansed heart-mind
(Ch. xin 心), once this has been achieved one can rely on intuition or spon-
taneous activity as a foundation for action. Third, Wang taught that: “all peo-
ple in the street are sages” (Chan 1962: 207). These principles have a clear
affinity with some interpretations of Buddha-nature or Buddha-mind within
the Chan/Zen traditions, and are also redolent of certain aspects of classical
Daoist thought, especially the primitivist and Yangist/antinomian elements
of the Zhuangzi. At any rate, in this radically leveling perspective there is no
need to rely on a higher authority, since even “heaven” (tian) is now “within
you.”
Before I went to Nanking, I still harbored a few ideas of the goody-goody
villager [who is pleasant but not always honest]. Now I believe in innate
knowledge. To me, what is right is right and what is wrong is wrong. I act
freely without any more effort to cover up or to conceal. Only, now I have
come to have the mind of the restrained. Let all people in the world say
that I do not cover up my words or deeds. It is all right with me.17
16 Walthall (1986: 223). Others have argued that, compared toChina, “JapaneseMaitreyawor-
shipwas passive, awaiting the coming of themessiah but not actively cleansing the ground
for his arrival” (White 1995: 117; see Yasumaru 1975: 94ff; Miyata 1970: 243). My view is that
even the “passive” use of Miroku (fused with other deities such as yonaoshi daimyōjin世
直し大明神) as a symbol for societal regeneration orworld renewal constitutes a political
act.
17 Cited inChan (1962: 208).HereWang is respondingdirectly to critics charginghis followers
with (“Zenist”) recklessness and libertinism.
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By all accounts, this analysis of the human condition—which, while
couched in traditional Confucian (and, to a lesser extent, Daoist and Buddhist)
terminology, is in some respects strikingly “modern”—was a primary inspira-
tion for Ōshio’s decision to rebel against the authorities.18 Indeed, the spirit of
forthrightness is evident in his 1837 manifesto, which bears comparison with
radical Zen Buddhist Uchiyama Gudō’s 1908 Anarcho-communist Revolution
(see Shields 2014).
As noted, the case of Ninomiya Sontoku presents us with a very different
outcome—one in which the “hero” is recognized not only by the people but by
the state as well. In order to flesh out the reasons for this difference, we should
turn first to Ninomiya’s ideas, including the religious currents that undergird
his thought. Like Confucius, the teachings of Ninomiya do not come directly
from the master himself, but were recorded by his students and published
after his death. His work is an eclectic blend of 1) “Shintō” animism: uplift-
ing agriculture because of its connection to the kami; 2) Confucian moralism:
insisting on the constant cultivation of virtue; and 3) Buddhist compassion,
which manifests itself in a commitment to sharing agricultural surplus with
the entire community. As with Ōshio (andWang Yangming), Sontoku was con-
vinced that thoughtmust alwaysmanifest as action—action that has an ethical
or social component. Thus his “philosophy” emerges as a form of ethical prin-
ciples and standards. While the bakufu adoptedmany of Sontoku’s techniques,
it was his moralistic vision that would have a more lasting cultural impact in
the emergence of the rural Hōtoku報徳 societies of the early twentieth cen-
tury. Initially formed by progressive landlords in the early Meiji period, these
societies found government favor in their attempt to promote the “harmony
of morality and economics.” From 1903, they began to receive official support
from theHomeMinistry, and in 1906were organized under an umbrella organi-
zation, the Hōtokutai報徳隊. “Invoking the example of the Tokugawa agricul-
tural moralist, Ninomiya Sontoku, they encouraged technical improvements
18 As a side note—and possible topic for further research—Wang’s direct criticism of Chan
Buddhism, which focuses on the function (as opposed to the nature) of the mind, and
particular its social and ethical implications, is strikingly prescient of modernist inter-
pretations of Buddhism extending from Inoue Enryō井上円了 (1858–1919) and the New
Buddhists through Seno’o Girō 妹尾義郎 (1889–1961) and Kawakami Hajime 河上肇
(1879–1946). To some extent, this is unsurprising, given: a) the influence of Wang Yang-
ming on Edo period Neo-Confucianism, and b) the impact of Neo-Confucian attacks of
Buddhism on post-haibutsu廃仏 “reform” movements. See Chan (1962: 211–214), for an
analysis ofWang’s critique of Buddhism. For Chan, these attacks “proved” thatWang Yang-
mingwas not really a “Buddhist”—but perhaps hewas simply a “Buddhist” of another sort?
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and the repayment of virtue (hōtoku) through honesty, diligence, and commu-
nal cooperation” (Gluck 1985: 190). Thus, despite the fact that Sontoku’s ideas
about communal farming are the most explicitly “socialistic” of the three fig-
ures described above, his lack of “resistance” to the Tokugawa state—and later
Meiji co-optation as a symbol of virtue, diligence and loyalty—render him an
ambiguous archetype for late Meiji socialists and radicals.19
Finally, it is worth noting the emergence inmid-Meiji—coinciding perfectly
with the birth of the Buddhist Enlightenment in the writings of Inoue Enryō—
of a group representing a fascinating conflation of traditional Buddhist lay
confraternities (kō), peasant unrest against “feudalism,” and the anti-clerical
tone of a fledgling New Buddhism. This organization, known as the Dannadera
Ridatsu Dōmei Kessha壇那寺離脱同盟結社 (Allied Lay Society for Breaking
Away fromParish Temples), went so far as to produce amanifesto (or “prospec-
tus”) in 1886, declaring their aims in the following fashion:
In regards to our school, today’s system appears to be exactly like the feu-
dalism of ancient times. All the subtemples around the country are like
the lords, and the believers affiliatedwith each temple are like their prop-
erty. In this situation where orders from the head temple are often not
carried out, [the subtemples] cannot engage in any dynamic movement
… 　This being the case, how could the situation be improved? Even if we
report this to the head temple, it would not be capable of doing [anything
…] Even if we seek the advice of subtemples, there is no one [capable]
there […]We and our like-minded comrades (wagahai dōshi我ガ輩同志)
make a pledge: we shall break away from our ancient parish temples; we
shall call ourselves simply “followers of the Honganji branch of the Shin
sect”; we shall choose by divination the appropriate location to build a
place for practice (dōjō道場), which will also serve for propagating our
teachings; we shall invite a priest whomwe respect and trust, and he will
be asked to supervise [this center].
—Meiji 20/04 (April 1887), [signed by] the advocates for the improve-
ment of the Honganji branch of the Shin sect.20
19 Sontoku remains popular today. In a 2006 nation-wide survey of the “100 Most Influential
People Ever” (including Japanese and non-Japanese) he comes in an impressive fortieth
place, just below Miyazawa Kenji (38) and John F. Kennedy (39), a full twenty-two spots
ahead of Jesus Christ (62).
20 “Ridan shuisho”離壇趣意書, in Meikyō shinshi 2065 (12 August 1886); trans. Ikeda (1998:
33–34).
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Despite the still-volatile political climate at the end of the second Meiji
decade, this movement still came as something of a surprise to Honganji 本
願寺 leaders, as well as to the editors of Meikyō shinshi明教新誌, who worried
that itwould soon engulf not only Ise provincebut the entire country.21 And yet,
despite the fact that, as Ikeda notes, “sectarian Buddhism had already entered
into a period of stability” by the late 1880s, accompanying this “stability” was
increasing tension between the clergy and laity. This was particularly true
within Jōdo Shinshū:
The Honganji branches’ treatment of its lay followers was changing radi-
cally around this time. Evidence of this can be found in the revised regu-
lations for teaching assemblies and lay societies, where the former spirit
of “oneness between clergy and laity” (sōzoku ittai 僧俗一体) had fun-
damentally collapsed. In the revised version we see that the “society of
priests” (sōryosha僧侶社) and the “society of believers” (shintosha信徒
社) are divided in two separate sections […] It was also a period when the
head temple was strengthening its administration system with priests at
the center, thereby moving in the direction of instituting a fixed category
represented by the separate small organizational element called “society
of believers.”
ikeda 1998: 34
Thus, while the Allied Lay Society for Breaking Away from Parish Temples
may represent an extreme case of lay Buddhist intransigence, in the context
of the times it becomes clear that they represent a fairly widespread desire
for autonomy—or at least, greater independence—among lay Buddhists, both
those associated with teaching assemblies and lay societies. Moreover, the
carryover of language and themes between the Allied Lay Society and the Edo-
period movements discussed above is clear, and bears witness to a significant
current of grassroots “protest,” one that by the 1880s hadmerged to somedegree
with the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement.
Conclusion
I conclude with a few points regarding several pitfalls to which I suggest con-
temporary scholars are prone. The first is the idea that, since the Shimabara
21 Meikyō shinshi 2064; trans. Ikeda (1998: 34).
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Rebellion of 1637–1638 (and perhaps even here, too), religion—generallymean-
ing religious belief as opposed to religious symbols and language—played little
or no role in popular contention in early modern Japan. This idea, which one
finds repeated in virtually every study of peasant rebellions of the Edo period,
is summarized well by James White: “It was not that there was no spiritually
based dissent in early modern Japan; rather, it occurred most frequently on
exclusively religious terms, andwhat therewas of a political and or social nature
never caught on” (White 1995: 116–119; see also, e.g., Walthall 1986: 123). My
concern here is with the phrase: “exclusively religious terms.” What does this
mean, in the context of Japanese religious traditions? The logic behind such a
claim is that the campaigns of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi “succeeded in oblit-
erating religion as a political force,” while the Tokugawa regime, “established
as an antireligious entity, [was] determined (despite its own reliance on neo-
Confucian justifications of its rule andBuddhist temples as agents of regulation
of the people) to eliminate religious organizations and beliefs as competitors
for the allegiance of the people” (White 1995: 116; see Aoki et al. 1981, 4: 279ff).
At one level this is quite correct. Certainly Nobunaga and Hideyoshi were
(rightly) threatened with the power of the Buddhist institutions of the day,
and took pains to defang the political power of these institutions in various
ways. And the early Tokugawa shoguns were concerned in turn with the dan-
gers of emergent Christianity, which explains their overwhelming reaction
to the Shimabara Rebellion. And yet, this hardly makes these figures or the
bakufu “antireligious.” As White notes, the shogunate was more than happy
to make use of the structures of institutional Buddhism and the ideas of Neo-
Confucianism to justify and sustain its rule. Moreover, using the work of Aoki
Michio青木道夫, White goes on to relate the numerous ways that contentious
peasants, as well, utilized religious symbols and sacred spaces, invoked the
authority of clerics, made vows and petitions to deities, and frequently dei-
fied their rebellious leaders after the fact. What is it that renders these actions
nonreligious?22 The problem here is a familiar one to scholars in the field of
religious studies: it is an attempt to locate the essence of religion in “belief”
22 In summing up his brief discussion of the bakumatsu yonaoshimovements,White asserts:
“Religious imagery along does not necessarily make social contention religious, and
aggressive behavior does not necessarily make a religious celebration a political move-
ment” (White 1995: 119). Perhaps, but this begs the question: What does? I concur with
Selçuk Esenbel, who argues that, despite attempts at suppression, “Tokugawa-Meiji upris-
ings continued to exhibit this religious character [i.e., of the early ikki], and professed a
traditional ethical vision of politics that combined the past and present in symbolism and
ideology” (Esenbel 1998: 26).
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as something ostensibly separate and readily distinguishable from matters of
culture, society, politics and economics. The assumption that religion used as
a means of either “social control” from above or “resistance” from below is not
actually religion is based on a flawed, essentialist premise, one that not only dis-
tinguishes, for example “this-worldly benefits” from “millenarian salvation,” but
implicitly suggests that the former does not belong to the category of “religion.”
Given the scholarlywork over the last few decades on the centrality of just such
“worldly benefits” (genze riyaku現是利益) to Japanese religious practice, this
assumption is particularly problematic.
The final issue I would like to raise is the assumption that historical actors
such as those mentioned in this paper were concerned with identifying with
a particular stream of Japanese religion or philosophy—Buddhist or other-
wise. Ninomiya was self-consciously eclectic in his sources and inspirations,
and while Ōshio was committed to Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism, this
tradition is itself famously hybrid, fusing elements of Chinese Daoism, Confu-
cianism and (especially Chan/Zen) Buddhism. We also see hybridity at work
in the work of the Buddhist Enlightenment figures and New Buddhists, though
here the influences tend to be Western in origin (Hegel, Theosophy, Unitari-
anism, and so on). Moreover, even in the work of Uchiyama Gudō and Taka-
gi Kenmyō, who as Buddhist monks associated with particular sects may be
expected to feel more pressure to conform to doctrinal exclusivity, we can find
clear signs of influence from outside their respective sects—especially with
Uchiyama, whose anarcho-communist vision is flavored with Zen, Nichiren,
Christian, Daoist and animist elements. Finally, I would like to reject the temp-
tation to conclude, upon discovery of these “external” influences, that the ideas
or activities of these figures are not thereby “Buddhist”—or only marginally
so. Again, this assumes that: a) these traditions were cleanly delineated in the
minds and/or the social discourse of the period; b) it would make any differ-
ence even if they were.
References
Amstutz, Galen. 2010. “Shin Buddhism and Burakumin in the Edo Period.” In The Social
Dimension of Shin Buddhism, ed. Ugo Dessì, Leiden: Brill, 59–110.
Andachi, Itsuo安立五男 (ed.). 1997. Bukkyō to burakumondai kankei shiryō shūse, dai ni
kan: TanbaTajimano kuni kankei shiryō仏教と部落問題関係資料集成、第二巻—丹
波但馬の国関係資料. Kobe: Akashi Shoten.
Aoki, Michio青木道夫, et al. 1981. Ikki一揆. 4 volumes. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shup-
pankai.
20 shields
Journal of Religion in Japan 5 (2016) 3–21
Bercé, Yves-Marie. 1980. Révoltes et Révolutions dans l’Europe Moderne. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France.
Bix,Herbert P. 1986. PeasantProtest in Japan, 1590–1884. Princeton: YaleUniversity Press.
Chan Wing-Tsit. 1962. “How Buddhistic is Wang Yangming?” Philosophy East & West
12(3): 203–215.
Esenbel, Selçuk. 1998. Even the Gods Rebel: The Peasants of Takaino and the 1871 Nakano
Uprising in Japan. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies.
Gluck, Carol. 1985. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Ikeda, Eishun池田英俊. 1988. “TeachingAssemblies and Lay Societies in the Formation
of Modern Sectarian Buddhism.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 25(1–2): 11–
44.
Ito, Lucy S. 1952. “Ko: Japanese Confraternities.”Monumenta Nipponica 8(1–2): 412–415.
Jansen, Marius B. 2000. The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Katsumata, Shizuo勝俣静夫. 1982. Ikki一揆. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.
Kelly, William W. 1985. Defense and Defiance in Nineteenth-Century Japan. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Lu, David. 1997. Japan: A Documentary History, volume 1. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Miyata, Noboru 宮田登. 1970. Miroku shinkō no kenkyū 弥勒信仰の研究. Tokyo:
Miraisha.
Morris, Ivan. 1975. The Nobility of Failure. New York: Holt, Rinehart, andWinston.
Najita, Tetsuo. 2002. “Andō Shōeki: The ‘Forgotten Thinker’ in Japanese History.” In
Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies, eds. Masao Miyoshi and Harry D.
Harootunian, Durham: Duke University Press, 61–79.
andVictorKoschmann (eds.). 1982.Conflict inModern JapaneseHistory. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
Nobi, Shōjiのびしょうじ. 2007.Hisabetsumintachi noŌsaka: Kinsei zenki hen非差別民た
ちの大阪—近世前期篇. Osaka: Kaihō Shuppansha.
Pauly, Ulrich. 1985. “Ikkō-ikki: Die Ikkō-Aufstände und ihre Entwicklung aus den Auf-
ständen der bündischen Bauern und Provinzen des japanischenMittelalters.” Ph.D.
diss., Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
Scott-Stokes, Henry. 1974. The Life andDeath of YukioMishima. New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux.
Shields, James Mark. 2012. “Awakening between Science, Art and Ethics: Variations on
Japanese Buddhist Modernism, 1890–1945.” In Rethinking Japanese Modernism, ed.
Roy Starrs, Leiden: Global Oriental (Brill), 105–124.
. 2014. “Zen and the Art of Treason: Radical Buddhism in Meiji Era (1868–1912)
Japan.”Politics, Religion & Ideology 15(2): 205–223.
. forthcoming. “Future Perfect: Tolstoy and the Structure of Taishō (Buddhist)
peasant revolts as anti-authoritarian archetypes 21
Journal of Religion in Japan 5 (2016) 3–21
Utopia.” InViolence, Nonviolence and JapaneseReligions, ed.MichelMohr, Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press.
and Patrice Ladwig. 2014. “Introduction” to Against Harmony: Radical Bud-
dhism in Thought and Practice. Special Issue of Politics, Religion & Ideology 15(2):
187–204.
Tsang, Carol Richmond. 2007.War and Faith: Ikkō Ikki in Late Muromachi Japan. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Vlastos, Stephen. 1986. Peasant Protests and Uprisings in Tokugawa Japan. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Walthall, Anne. 1986. Social Protest and Popular Culture in Eighteenth-Century Japan.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
. 1991a. “Introduction” to Peasant Uprisings in Japan: A Critical Anthology of
PeasantHistories, ed. and trans. AnneWalthall. Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
. 1991b. “Rereading PeasantHistories of PeasantUprisings.” In PeasantUprisings
in Japan: A Critical Anthology of Peasant Histories, ed. and trans. Anne Walthall.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
. 1991c. “The Sakura Sōgorō Story.” In Peasant Uprisings in Japan: A Critical
Anthology of Peasant Histories, ed. and trans. Anne Walthall. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Weinstein, Stanley. 2006. “Continuity andChange in the Thought of Rennyo.” In Rennyo
and the Roots of Modern Japanese Buddhism, eds. Mark Blum and Shin’ya Yasutomi.
New York: Oxford University Press, 49–58.
White, James W. 1995. Ikki: Social Conflict and Political Protest in Early Modern Japan.
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Yamamoto, Naotomo山本尚友. 1999. Hisabetsu burakushi no kenkyū: Ikōki o chushin ni
shite非差別部落史の研究—移行期を中心にして. Tokyo: Iwata Shoin.
Yasumaru, Yoshio 安丸良夫. 1975. Nihon no kindaika to minshū shishō 日本の近代
化と民衆思想. Tokyo: Aoki Shuppan.
Yokoyama, Toshio横山十四男. 1977. Hyakushō ikki to gimin denshō百姓一揆と義民伝
承. Tokyo: Kyōikusha.
